Dear subscribers,
This is update #1589 for Friday evening, December 23, 2011.
Many subscribers have asked about apparently "sudden" price changes for numerous exchange-traded funds including GDXJ, TAN, and SEA. These funds periodically pay dividends: some of them quarterly, some of them semi-annually, and some of them annually. If you use good-until-cancelled ladders of orders, as I recommend, then your orders to buy GDXJ would have been reduced by 1.59 to account for the total amount which will be paid to those shareholders who held it as of the end of yesterday's after-hours session. TAN was reduced by 22 cents, and SEA by 10 cents. Therefore, if you bought GDXJ today at 24.41, it is equivalent to buying it for 26.00 the day before or at any time during the past year, since you will not be entitled to the total distribution of 1.59. For some funds, such as ZROZ, these distributions can be a substantial percentage of the total valuation. Most of these distributions qualify as long-term capital gains or qualified dividends which are taxed for U.S. residents at the favorable rate of 15%. In general, it is better to pay an additional 15% tax in 2011 than to pay taxes at a rate of 35% in 2012 on the same amount. Your eventual net capital gain is of course automatically reduced by the amount of these distributions, because of the lower post-adjusted share price.
For the fourth consecutive day, most risk assets continued to rebound, with tax-loss selling continuing primarily for the weakest performers of 2011. Some subscribers have asked if tax-loss selling can continue all the way until the bitter end of December, and I have seen numerous instances when it has done exactly that. Of course, it is not just "real" tax-loss selling, but often momentum players selling to chase tax-loss underperformance, or amateurs emotionally discouraged about owning a "losing" security and thereby selling out of disappointment. Unless you own very short-term call options which are likely to expire worthless, it is rarely sensible to sell for tax-loss reasons since you are locking in an unrealized loss near a bottom. In addition, you are simply postponing your taxes for a year--and could even cost you money if your marginal tax rate is higher in 2012 than it is in 2011.
Safe-haven assets have been diverging. The U.S. dollar index remains close to 80, thereby barely retreating from its recent 11-month peak, while TLT has suffered a somewhat greater loss but still remains slightly above its key 50-day simple moving average of 117.45. The 200-day simple moving average for TLT is 103.70; I expect TLT's 200dma to be broken to the downside by an unknown percentage during the first quarter of 2012 which will trigger a buying opportunity for both TLT and ZROZ.
Because of the dividend adjustments mentioned in the first paragraph, my highest order to buy GDXJ is currently 23.40 (versus a pre-dividend level of 24.99), while my highest order to buy more TAN is 2.18 (versus 2.40). I may add additional orders at higher prices depending upon developments.
Not many investors are anticipating a significant "January effect" rebound, thereby making it more likely to occur:
Mitt Romney has probably made a mistake by deciding not to publicly release his income-tax forms:
The following is a hilarious spoof which splices in actual Congressional clips:
The U.S. dollar index dropped to a 1:40 a.m. low of 79.728, and then rebounded to an 11:25 a.m. high of 80.060 before ending the day modestly higher
near 80.00.
The U.S. dollar index has been in a long-term bull market since March 16, 2008, when it had completed an all-time bottom at 70.698.
Since then, the U.S. dollar index completed its first higher low of 71.314 on July 15, 2008; its second higher low of 72.696 on May 4, 2011; its
third higher low of 73.421 on July 27, 2011; its fourth higher low of 73.452 on August 17, 2011; and its fifth higher low of 73.525 on August 29, 2011.
On December 21, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slid to a 5:30 a.m. bottom of 79.228, its most depressed mark since December 12, 2011.
On December 14, 2011, the U.S. dollar index rallied to an 11:10 a.m. peak of 80.730, its most elevated reading since January 13, 2011.
On November 30, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slumped to a 9:00 a.m. bottom of 77.923, its lowest level since November 23, 2011.
On November 8, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slid to an evening bottom of 76.513, its lowest mark since October 25, 2011.
On October 27, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slumped to a 2 p.m. bottom of 74.724, its lowest level since September 6, 2011.
On August 29, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slid to a very early morning bottom of 73.525, its lowest point since August 17, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slumped to a mid-morning bottom of 73.452, its lowest level since July 27, 2011.
On July 27, 2011, the U.S. dollar index retreated to a very early morning bottom of 73.421, its most depressed mark since May 5, 2011.
On May 4, 2011, the U.S. dollar index slid to a mid-morning bottom of 72.696, its lowest point since July 29, 2008.
On January 10, 2011, the U.S. dollar index climbed to an early morning peak of 81.313, its most elevated level since December 1, 2010.
On November 30, 2010, the U.S. dollar index rallied to an early morning peak of 81.444, its most elevated level since September 20, 2010.
Relevant past peaks for the U.S. dollar index include 88.708 on June 6, 2010, 89.624 on March 4, 2009, 92.63 on November 16, 2005, 99.49 on
August 26, 2003, and 120.99 on July 5, 2001.
I expect the U.S. dollar index to peak in 2014 between 100 and 120.
TLT, a fund of U.S. Treasuries averaging 28 years to maturity, slid to a 12:51 p.m. bottom of 117.74, its lowest point since December 13, before
closing down 1.33 at 118.27.
The nearly vertical ascent for TLT from July through October 4, 2011 was typical of a blowoff top, which may have completed a double top
on December 19, 2011 and which will inevitably lead to a substantial plunge.
TLT is likely to break below its 200-day simple moving average where I will progressively repurchase it, probably during the first quarter of 2012.
ZROZ is a zero-coupon fund of U.S. Treasuries averaging 28 years to maturity, which is roughly twice as volatile as TLT in both directions.
Non-U.S. residents will enjoy even greater gains in home-currency terms by owning TLT and ZROZ as the U.S. dollar rallies strongly through 2014.
On December 19, 2011, TLT rallied to a 3:45 p.m. peak of 124.02, its most elevated point since October 4, 2011 and less than 1% below its
all-time high.
On December 1, 2011, TLT slid to an early morning bottom of 115.80, its lowest level since November 11, 2011.
On November 10, 2011, TLT slumped to a 1:02 p.m. bottom of 115.21, its lowest reading since October 31, 2011.
On October 27, 2011, TLT slumped to a late afternoon bottom of 109.82, its lowest mark since September 1, 2011.
On October 4, 2011, TLT rallied to a 10 a.m. all-time zenith of 125.03.
On July 25, 2011, TLT slumped to a pre-market bottom of 94.75, its most depressed reading since July 7, 2011.
On June 30, 2011, TLT slumped to a mid-morning bottom of 93.29, its lowest level since May 2, 2011.
On April 8, 2011, TLT slid to a pre-market bottom of 89.64, its lowest level since February 18, 2011.
On February 10, 2011, TLT retreated to a late morning bottom of 88.14, its lowest point since April 7, 2010.
On August 25, 2010, TLT surged to an early morning peak of 109.34, its highest level since January 28, 2009.
On April 7, 2010, TLT slumped to an early morning bottom of 87.30, its lowest point since September 20, 2007.
VIX is probably the best-known measure of equity index implied volatility, which is synonymous with investors' fear of an upcoming bear market.
VIX edged up to a 10:19 a.m. high of 21.21, and then retreated to a late afternoon low of 20.72 before closing down 43 cents at 20.73.
To those who are bearish on equities: find me a bear market which began with VIX making such a consistent pattern of numerous lower highs.
Whenever VIX slumps into the mid-teens, this will likely become an important sell signal for equities.
On December 22, 2011, VIX slid to a 10 a.m. bottom of 20.34, its most depressed point since July 26, 2011.
On December 8, 2011, VIX climbed to a late afternoon peak of 30.91, its highest reading since November 29, 2011.
On November 25, 2011, VIX climbed to an early morning peak of 34.77, its most elevated level since November 21, 2011.
On November 21, 2011, VIX rallied to a late morning peak of 35.29, its highest mark since November 17, 2011.
On November 17, 2011, VIX surged to a 1:52 p.m. peak of 36.46, its highest point since November 1, 2011.
On November 9, 2011, VIX soared to a late afternoon peak of 36.43, its most elevated reading since November 1, 2011.
On November 1, 2011, VIX soared to a noon peak of 37.53, its highest mark since October 7, 2011 and a gain of more than 53% within 1-1/2 trading days.
On October 4, 2011, VIX climbed to a 10 a.m. peak of 46.88, its highest level since August 9, 2011.
On August 9, 2011, VIX rallied to a post-Fed-announcement high of 47.56.
On August 8, 2011, VIX soared exactly 50% to its intraday peak of 48.00, its highest reading since May 21, 2010.
On July 22, 2011, VIX dropped to a noon bottom of 17.14, its lowest reading since July 8, 2011.
On July 1, 2011, VIX slumped to a mid-afternoon bottom of 15.12, its most depressed mark since May 2, 2011.
On April 28, 2011, VIX plummeted to a late afternoon bottom of 14.27, its lowest reading since June 21, 2007.
VIX dropping below 15 on an intraday basis demonstrates an astonishingly dangerous level of investor complacency toward the potential of a
double-dip recession, and is similar to the VIX levels in 2007-2008 preceding the last severe global equity bear market. This makes a major
bear market in global risk assets even more likely through 2012-2013.
On May 21, 2010, VIX soared to an early morning peak of 48.20, its most elevated mark since March 10, 2009.
The S&P 500 index climbed to a late afternoon peak of 1265.42, its most elevated point since December 7, before closing up 11.33 at 1265.33.
For those who are fans of the monk from the Middle Ages, the 61.8% Fibonacci retracement of its entire rally from October 4 through October 27 is
precisely 1158.00, which was broken to the downside several times during the pre-market and after-hours sessions on Friday, November 25, 2011.
A double top with the May 2, 2011 peak of 1370 and perhaps reaching 1400 is likely during the next few months;
any apparent upside breakout above that level would represent a prime selling (and short-selling) opportunity for the most overvalued and overbought
equities.
Its very-long-term bear market will remain intact until the S&P 500 ultimately completes a nadir which is accompanied by a dividend
yield above six percent, just as U.S. equities overall have done during all prior eras of stagnation.
On December 19, 2011, the S&P 500 slid to a late afternoon bottom of 1202.37, its most depressed mark since November 30, 2011.
On December 7, 2011, the S&P 500 rallied to a late afternoon peak of 1267.06, its highest point since November 9, 2011.
On November 25, 2011, the S&P 500 slid to a late afternoon bottom of 1158.66, its lowest level since October 10, 2011. If you count the
pre-market session, the futures-equivalent low at 8:36 a.m. was 1149.60, which would mark its cheapest price since October 6, 2011.
On October 27, 2011, the S&P 500 soared to a late afternoon peak of 1292.66, its most elevated point since August 1, 2011.
On October 4, 2011, the S&P 500 plummeted to a 10 a.m. bottom of 1074.77, its lowest mark since September 1, 2010.
On August 9, 2011, the S&P 500 slumped to a post-Fed mid-afternoon bottom of 1101.54, its most depressed reading since September 9, 2010.
On July 21, 2011, the S&P 500 climbed to a mid-afternoon peak of 1347.00, its highest mark since July 8, 2011.
On July 7, 2011, the S&P 500 surged to a mid-afternoon peak of 1356.48, its most elevated reading since May 10, 2011.
On May 10, 2011, the S&P 500 rallied to a late afternoon peak of 1359.44, its highest level since May 3, 2011.
On May 2, 2011, the S&P 500 rallied to a mid-morning peak of 1370.58, its highest level since June 9, 2008.
On August 27, 2010, the S&P 500 retreated to a mid-morning bottom of 1039.70, its lowest point since July 7, 2010.
On July 1, 2010, the S&P 500 slid to a late morning bottom of 1010.91, its lowest mark since September 4, 2009.
GDX, a fund of primarily large-cap gold mining shares, rose to close up 54 cents at its intraday high of 52.79.
Large-cap gold mining shares are probably pointing the way upward for equities in general, and had accurately signaled several recent
global stock-market corrections.
On December 21, 2011, GDX rose to a 10:41 a.m. peak of 53.43, its highest point since December 13, 2011.
On December 19, 2011, GDX slid to a late afternoon bottom of 51.03, its most depressed reading since October 4, 2011.
On December 1, 2011, GDX rose to a mid-morning peak of 61.01, its most elevated mark since November 16, 2011.
On November 8, 2011, GDX rose to a 1 p.m. peak of 63.69, its highest level since September 21, 2011.
On October 4, 2011, GDX plummeted to a late afternoon bottom of 50.42, its lowest mark since August 25, 2010.
On September 21, 2011, GDX rallied to a mid-afternoon (pre-Fed) peak of 66.90, just 8 cents below its all-time high from September 9, 2011.
On September 9, 2011, GDX climbed to a mid-morning all-time high of 66.98.
On June 16, 2011, GDX slumped to a late afternoon bottom of 51.10, its most depressed reading since August 25, 2010.
On December 7, 2010, GDX rallied to an early morning zenith of 64.62, a new all-time high.
On July 28, 2010, GDX retreated to an early morning bottom of 46.80, its lowest point since May 21, 2010.
On Tuesday, September 6, 2011, December 2011 gold futures soared to a very early morning all-time zenith of 1923.70 U.S. dollars per troy ounce.
On Monday, April 25, 2011, May 2011 silver futures achieved a post-midnight zenith of 49.820 U.S. dollars per troy ounce, the highest level
for silver since it completed a nearly identical intraday peak on January 21, 1980. So far, the highest point in the cycle for SLV was its April 28, 2011
late morning zenith of 48.35. SLV would have traded at 48.71 if it had been available for trading in the early morning of April 25, 2011
when silver futures completed their historic double top. On April 21, 2011, Market Vane reported a 96% bullish consensus on silver, one of the
highest readings ever recorded since silver began trading on the first business day of 1972. Silver's behavior in 2008-2013 has so far been quite
similar to that of the Nasdaq in 1998-2002; if you divide the Nasdaq by 100, you will see some amazing parallels. This is primarily because all
bubbles behave nearly identically. I am also expecting gold to plummet dramatically from its peak level, perhaps by more than 50%, within two years,
with numerous strong upward bounces along the way.
Today's main topic is inflation's certainty.
During the past fifteen years, housing bubbles have unexpectedly arisen in much of the world's population. In some cases such as Dublin or Orlando, those bubbles have already collapsed; in other instances such as Vancouver, they will eventually collapse but have not yet done so. If you had asked me fifteen years ago whether we would experience housing bubbles, I would have answered that the situation in Japan in the 1980s was unique and was unlikely to be repeated for two main reasons: 1) people would have learned the lessons of Japan and would not wish to repeat the severe pain of fifteen consecutive years of falling housing prices in Japan from 1990-2004 with a total net loss of 64%; 2) the circumstances which would allow real estate to become a risk asset like stocks or bonds was highly unlikely to occur elsewhere, since it had occurred rarely in the past.
As it turned out, I was as wrong as possible on both counts. Although a small percentage of people--surprisingly few--knew what had happened in Japan, they felt that their neighborhood was uniquely special and blessed--a strange denial of reality which persists to the present day. In addition, the circumstances which create a housing bubble are apparently more common that I had realized; for instance, Florida had a pretty extreme housing bubble which arose in the 1920s and burst spectacularly in 1926, more than 3-1/2 years prior to the stock-market crash of 1929.
Now that we have numerous housing bubbles in China, India, Brazil, Canada, Australia, and several dozen other countries, it is simply a matter of time before prices in real terms plummet by two thirds as they have already done in parts of the United States, Ireland, Spain, and elsewhere. One negative impact will be reduced demand for construction and real-estate industries; another will be increased defaults and foreclosures which will put pressure on banks and mortgage companies. The most severe response, however, is less obvious, and is known as the negative wealth effect. When housing prices plummet, consumers feel psychologically poorer as a result of a slumping net worth, and thereby spend much less money in the present. This phenomenon has been well documented. The reason that the negative wealth effect is so much more dramatic for real estate than for something such as, say, the Nasdaq bubble, is that a person with a net worth of 70 thousand dollars may have at most 40 or 50 thousand invested in the stock market. Because of mortgage leverage, however, this person may have a house worth 500 thousand dollars (or more), and therefore even a moderate decline of 25% will cause such a person to have a negative net worth. In other words, since middle- and working-class homeowners will have a disproportionate percentage of their total net worth in their home(s), a real-estate decline will be far more devastating than a pullback for any other asset class.
Governments are well aware of the risks of falling housing prices. Ben Bernanke's entire performance as Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve has been to combat the negative effects of slumping real estate. He knows that it is simply impossible to prevent overvalued housing prices from collapsing in real terms and eventually becoming fundamentally undervalued. Therefore, the only successful method for combating rising foreclosures and bank failures is via inflation. If we have 10% inflation in a given year, then a 10% drop in real terms for a house will translate into no net change in its nominal price. If we have 10% inflation for five consecutive years, then a drop of more than half in real terms will appear to the average person to be a wonderful condition of stable housing prices. Therefore, causing nominal U.S. housing prices to flatten (or rise) has been Bernanke's primary goal since he took over the Fed.
At first, the heads of other central banks didn't perceive this basic truth. They saw rising inflation as a threat, and therefore raised interest rates to combat it. Only now are most of the world's central banks finally realized what Bernanke knew all along: in order to prevent their own countries' real-estate collapses from leading to a severe recession, they must increase inflation to a rate close to 10%--or a similar amount which will approximately counteract the real average loss in housing values.
Of course, in terms of actual purchasing power, some people will notice that their houses continue to be worth less and less in terms of the number of gallons of gasoline that their house is worth, or the number of ounces of gold, or the number of loaves of bread. However, this cannot be prevented or ameliorated; a dangerous overvaluation in any asset will always be followed eventually by an equally dramatic undervaluation. The trick is to fool as many people as possible as much of the time as possible. So if someone has a house which is worth 200 thousand dollars, and it is still worth 200 thousand dollars five years later, many people will be perfectly happy even if the cost of living has increased by 50% or so over the same period of time. They will be much less pleased if the cost of living remains steady, while their house is worth proportionately less. It's a game that central banks are playing with the public, and they wouldn't play it unless they knew they would "win" in the minds of most people.
Inflation benefits some groups of people at the detriment of other groups. Those who owe money for any reason, whether it be for mortgages or credit cards or student loans, love to see as much inflation as possible since it diminishes the value of their outstanding loan obligations. In contrast, those who rely on fixed pensions, or social security, or fixed-payment annuities, or who own debt of any kind (think China's central bank, or Japan's), will be badly hurt by rising inflation. Now review the first two items in the previous sentence--fixed pensions and social security. Because of politicians promising pensions for public workers which are far too generous especially in terms of a weak economy, and because of social security obligations, governments would love to be able to reduce the real values of these future liabilities. On the other hand, do you think they really care if foreign central banks are losing money in real terms on their Treasury holdings? That could even be a political plus. Thus, by massively increasing the inflation rate, they will gain not only from creating the illusion of housing-price stability, but also from diminishing the impact of future pension payments and other legally mandated obligations. This becomes a win-win situation in which the temptation to inflate has numerous advantages and very few drawbacks. Of course, there will be many who will experience a reduced standard of living from receiving future payments which will be considerably lower in real terms, but such folks will be happily sacrificed to satisfy the much larger and generally more vocal majority who will be much happier with higher inflation rates. Even teachers and others who will be forced to tolerate lower real pensions will keep quiet as their mortgage obligations are less onerous.
You're probably thinking at this point: if Ben Bernanke realized this fact several years ago, and other central banks are beginning to finally understand it, then why don't we already have 10% inflation in the United States--or even 5%? Of course we do have inflation in some segments of the economy, but it tends to be well hidden. More importantly, however, we have the massive deflationary impact of plummeting real-estate prices. Consider that the average family spends about 40 thousand dollars per year on all expenses. If gasoline, food, and similar items increase by 10% annually, then this is four thousand dollars more in required expenses. Meanwhile, if the average family has a house worth 200 thousand dollars which drops by 10%, then this is a loss of twenty thousand dollars--which is five times as great. In other words, whenever housing prices are falling rapidly, the deflationary impact of such a decline will overwhelm any increase in other forms of measurable inflation, thereby keeping inflation at bay and occasionally even creating actual deflation. This is why the Fed has cut interest rates virtually to zero, and why other central banks will be doing likewise over the next few years.
You're probably starting to realize where this argument is going. Sooner or later, housing prices will either stop falling, or will noticeably slow their rate of decline. When this happens, at long last, the inflationary impact of rising prices for other goods and services will be greater than the deflationary impact of real-estate losses. At that point, central banks will finally get what they had been hoping for--and then some. Once the inflationary genie is out of the bottle and running rampant, it's not very easy to reverse the process. This is why I believe that before the end of the current decade, and perhaps as soon as 2017 or 2018, we will experience double-digit interest rates for 30-year U.S. Treasuries. Investors will eventually demand much higher rates of interest in order to combat the much higher perceived future risk of rising inflation. In August 1981, the 30-year yield surpassed 14%, so 10% may be too conservative an estimate especially since there were no housing bubbles prior to the inflationary binge more than three decades ago.
What is most important to subscribers is how to invest in anticipation of much higher inflation later in the decade. All of those investments which are currently ridiculously popular with investors, such as high-dividend shares, utilities, REITs, tobacco companies, and convertible preferreds, will almost surely be among the poorest performers through perhaps 2020. These companies' primary lure is their above-average dividends--which will have to keep being raised in order to compete with Treasuries and even with bank CD yields which will eventually rise much more dramatically than most people can currently imagine. The only way that dividend yields can rise sharply is for their prices to fall just as sharply.
Historically, the top performers in any era of sharply rising inflation are the shares of commodity producers. In recent years, those who have invested in shares of gold producers, or crude-oil producers, and similar industries, have been disappointed by the underperformance of these shares relative to their respective commodities. All kinds of excuses have been proposed for this underperformance, including competition from commodity ETFs and rising costs. However, the real reason is that slumping housing prices in one important part of the world or another in recent years, and probably for a few more years, make it impossible for a true inflationary situation to exist through perhaps 2014-2015. Therefore, commodity shares are underperforming as a way of saying: "Look at me. I'm not doing well, even though my product is rising in price, since those falling housing prices will keep a tight lid on global inflationary pressures. Once housing prices are closer to important bottoms around the world, just watch how well I'm going to do." The biggest surprise for many investors, even those who tend to be bullish on the shares of commodity producers, will be how much they end up gaining during the next global bull market. Even if the prices of gold, crude oil, copper, and other commodities gain about the same percentage from bottom to top during the next bull market as they had done during the previous one, the total increases for the shares of commodity producers will be about twice as high on average. I do not consider this to be an exaggerated forecast, but a realistic one.
This is also consistent with the behavior of U.S. Treasuries over lengthy periods of time. While some investors know that U.S. Treasuries are one of the world's most notable long-term bull markets, having been in an uptrend since August 1981, far fewer people realize that we previously had a 35-year bear market for U.S. Treasuries from 1946 through 1981. The post-World War II experience in the United States involved the perception of continually rising inflation, which eventually became assumed to persist indefinitely. If you don't believe it, read a few newspaper articles about inflation from 1979-1981, or get the book Getting by on $100,000 a Year (and Other Sad Tales) by Andrew Tobias, which was published in September 1980. Once U.S. Treasuries finally peak at some point in 2013 or 2014, they could similarly experience a lengthy downtrend even if it doesn't necessarily persist for a few decades. On December 19, 2011, U.S. Treasuries had become among the most desired asset classes worldwide. You can imagine that they would be even more eagerly accumulated if we were to experience a meaningful equity bear market at any point during the next few years. Whenever we have the maximum amount of crowding into any asset class, we are likely to suffer the maximum loss. Because the U.S. Treasury market far exceeds the value of U.S. equities, and had a greater total market capitalization even when Treasuries were bottoming in February 2011, this will have a major impact on all assets during the entire second half of the current decade (i.e., from 2015-2020).
The above reasoning is not why I currently favor owning the shares of commodity producers; I like them today because I believe there is far too much negative sentiment and their valuations have become unusually depressed in recent months. The pro-inflation argument becomes much more compelling a couple of years from now, rather than immediately, since numerous housing bubbles are in the early stages of their collapse and will probably suffer their biggest losses in 2012-2014. If the entire global real-estate market today were like Phoenix or Orlando, then an inflationary surge would be imminent and I would be even more heavily invested in gold mining shares and other commodity producers; such a day will arrive, but not in the near future. One advantage of this conclusion is that the same funds which were among the top performers during the last bull market, including KOL, RSX, EWZ, GDX, GDXJ, SLX, and SEA, will likely be among the top performers during the next multi-year bull market. Eventually, when all of your friends and family are finally convinced that you're right and begin heavily accumulating these shares in 2017 or 2018, the game will be over and it will become necessary for me to heavily research REITs, utilities, tobacco shares, and similar high-dividend sectors which I can happily ignore at the present time. After all, subscribers probably want to keep making money after 2020. For now, though, we can take it one decade at a time.
Take care and enjoy the long weekend. I will send my usual Sunday update on Monday since there will be no Monday trading in most countries.
--Steve
If you would like to give someone an unusual New Year's gift, consider an eight-hour videorecording of my September 2011 investing seminar which gives lots of details in particular about what will likely occur in 2012 and 2013:
As with everything else which I promote in my updates, I am not receiving a "cut" or other compensation from these sales. I'm only the star, not the producer. I have no doubt that Glen will be pleased if you buy his 4-DVD set.